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Essay
Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty
Years of Sheff v. O’Neill
JUSTIN R. LONG
Professor Lani Guinier and others have recently developed a theory
called “demosprudence” that explains the democracy-enhancing potential
of certain types of U.S. Supreme Court dissents. Separately, state
constitutionalists have described state constitutions’ capacity to offer a
base of resistance against the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow conception of
individual rights. Applying these two seemingly unrelated theories to
school desegregation litigation in Connecticut and to same-sex marriage
litigation in Iowa, this Essay suggests that certain state constitutional
decisions might function like U.S. Supreme Court dissents to enhance
democratic activism. In this way, interactive federalism might usefully
serve as a category of demosprudence.
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Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty
Years of Sheff v. O’Neill
JUSTIN R. LONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, civil rights lawyers sued state officials on behalf of
school children in Hartford, Connecticut, complaining that the nearly allwhite suburban schools and nearly all-minority city schools violated the
state constitution. The lawyers sued in court because state politicians
seemed not to be responding to the de facto segregation. Rather than fight
what looked like a futile political campaign, a lawsuit could compel the
desegregation Hartford children needed. The lawyers sued under the state
constitution because they knew that the U.S. Supreme Court was steadily
withdrawing the courts from their historic role in school desegregation.
The Connecticut Constitution and courts could avoid this federal
retrenchment. In this way, both law and politics were causes of the
landmark Sheff v. O’Neill1 case, and both legal and political change were
its goals. But constitutional theorists, however, have struggled with how to
reconcile law and politics in a principled fashion.2 If our nation is a
democracy, what legitimacy can there be for counter-majoritarian law? If
we are subject to the rule of law, what room is left for popular will?
Lani Guinier’s recently developed idea of “demosprudence” offers a
new way of thinking about the law/politics divide. Guinier argues that
certain kinds of judicial decisions, and dissents in particular, can inspire
popular responses in the form of social and political activism. These
political activities can, in turn, affect judges’ understanding of fundamental
constitutional norms. In this way, there is an ongoing national debate
about the meaning of the most important values embedded in the federal
Constitution. U.S. Supreme Court opinions are not merely politics by
another means, nor are politics merely parallel to legal interpretation.
Instead, both judicial and social activity together comprise a broader
conversation about the interpretation of the core constitutional values
*
Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Harvard College;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law. I thank Michael Fischl, Rick Kay, Bob Williams, the
participants in the University of Connecticut School of Law faculty workshop series, and Ariana
Silverman for helpful comments.
1
678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996) (declaring unconstitutional state statutes responsible for de
facto school segregation).
2
See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Professor & Dean of Stanford Law School, “The Interest of the
Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, in 41
VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 699–700 (2006) (describing the difficulty and importance of distinguishing
between law and politics).
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underlying our democracy.
Meanwhile, Paul Kahn,4 James Gardner,5 Robert Schapiro,6 and other
state constitutional scholars7 have persuasively argued that state
constitutional jurisprudence can usefully function as a site of resistance to
federal constitutional interpretations, a theory known as “interactive
federalism.”8 If the U.S. Supreme Court fails to protect such rights as
privacy, marriage equality, or public education under the federal
Constitution, state high courts may, and often do, provide a competing
constitutional vision that does protect those liberties. Although the states’
more expansive protection of civil rights formally derives from the state
constitutions, interactive federalism suggests that the true debate
underlying these decisions is a dispute about the basic values we share as
Americans. State constitutionalism, in this view, can and should function
as a legal space for contesting the dominant federal interpretation of
national norms. Furthermore, state constitutional jurisprudence can
galvanize a popular political response that leads either to changes in
federal jurisprudence or to new legislative action.9
This Essay suggests a previously overlooked link between the theories
of demosprudence and interactive federalism. Using the example of Sheff
v. O’Neill, this Essay asks, “Can state constitutional decisions function as
demosprudential dissents?” Preliminary analysis of the Sheff litigation and
same-sex marriage litigation suggests that scholars of demosprudence and
state constitutionalism have much to learn from each other. Imagining
state constitutional decisions as demosprudential dissents offers a new
perspective on federal and state constitutional theory, and potentially offers
a democracy-enhancing justification for American federalism.
II. DEMOSPRUDENCE
Professor Guinier’s far-reaching insight is that U.S. Supreme Court
dissents can be effective beyond merely persuading some as-yet unseated

3

See Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–18,
58–59 (2008) (discussing how dissenting opinions are illustrative of this theory).
4
See Paul Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1147, 1148 (1993) (rejecting a separate-spheres approach to federalism).
5
See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE
OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (Univ. of Chi. Press 2005).
6
See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Univ. of Chi. Press 2009); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005) (providing a useful background and historical
evaluation of this philosophy).
7
See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 95 (2000) (describing state constitutional interpretation as
legitimately reactive to federal constitutional law).
8
Id.
9
E.g., id. at 298.

2009]

DEMOSPRUDENCE, INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM

589

Court majority to overturn the disfavored decision in the misty future.10
Rather, as Robert Williams pointed out in 1984, the Justices’ dissents can,
and sometimes do, address contemporary political forces.11 By inspiring,
comforting, and teaching common people affected by the Court’s opinion,
dissents can reach past legal elites to provoke democratic engagement and
change.12
Guinier identifies three defining characteristics of the demosprudential
dissent: substantively, the dissent is about a basic issue of democracy;
stylistically, the dissent is written with a tone and structure that address a
broader audience than the legal in-crowd; and procedurally, the dissent
challenges that broader audience to exercise popular sovereignty by
counteracting the majority opinion.13 Guinier points out that part of the
populism-provoking capacity of the demosprudential dissent comes from
its partial-outsider status. The dissent is conducive to popular inspiration
in part because it lacks the compelling power of the state behind it; dissents
establish no precedent and justify no legal violence. Instead, dissents
inherently offer a challenge to the prevailing legal norm and an alternative
to the state’s use of force to carry out that norm. Dissents, like the sociopolitical action they hope to provoke, are an act of resistance.14
By describing an imagined alternative to the legal world defined by the
majority opinion, and by drawing ordinary people into sharing the
dissenter’s vision, dissents protect what Robert Cover called the
“jurisgenerative” features of communal life.15 Justices accomplish this,
Guinier suggests, by writing directly to the public (or affected segments of
it) in language that avoids dry, cold legalisms in favor of emotional appeals
to common national values. The best demosprudential dissents attend to
“the premises behind the logic, the stories and not just the explanations”
underlying the Court’s constitutional hermeneutics.16 In doing so, they
welcomeperhaps “authorize”everyday folk to oppose the Court’s

10
See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 50–51 (“Simply by contesting the view of the Court
majority, the dissenter may reveal a more transparent deliberative process of lawmaking.”).
11
See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35. S.C. L. REV. 353, 375 (1984) (noting the influence of U.S.
Supreme Court dissents on Congressand state courts); see also Robert Post, Law Professors and
Political Scientists: Observations on the Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89
B.U. L. REV. 581, 582 (2009) (describing the significance of Guinier’s theory as its placement of
judges within, rather than apart from, democratic deliberation).
12
See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 15–16 (explaining that dissents sometimes focus on
“enhancing . . . democratic potential” rather than reasoning through traditional legal forms).
13
See id. at 49 (describing the elements of a demosprudential dissent).
14
See id. at 48–49 (noting that dissents challenge, rather than exercise, the law’s coercive power).
15
See Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 539, 544–45 (2009) (citing Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983)) (describing demosprudential dissents as a method of cooperation between legal elites
and ordinary people).
16
See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 11, 13 (describing a Justice Breyer dissent).

590

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:585

17

conclusion.
In contrast, conventional constitutional thought suggests that U.S.
Supreme Court opinions end the debate about the fundamental norms at
stake in the decided case; it is for this reason that advocates of judicial
minimalism urge the Court to avoid reaching these profound questions.18
For reasons of popular sovereignty, Larry Kramer seems appalled19 by the
way that Supreme Court decisions exhibit the “jurispathic”
tendenciesthe killing of ongoing popular debate about the meaning(s) of
fundamental social values as embodied in lawthat Professor Cover
described.20 Demosprudence offers a path toward revival of alternative,
non-statist nomoi and narratives because it reminds us that court law and
folk law are articulated, just as the leg bone is connected to the hip bone.
We the People occasionally find sufficient inspiration in judicial dissents,
like Justice Ginsburg’s in Ledbetter21 or Justice Breyer’s in Parents
Involved,22 to take up the colors and recapture the legal battlements. As
new scholarship from Jason Mazzone confirms,23 the Court speaks, but it
lacks the last word.
Unfortunately, the orality of dissents from the bench attracts Guinier’s
attention as particularly promising for democratic engagement.24 “The
idea,” she argues, “is that speech is primary, present, natural, interior, real,
authentic, and whole, and writing is secondary, artificial, exterior, a
representation of speech, a substitute for speech, removed from reality, a
subversion or corruption of the original speech.”25 Even if true, the neartotal unavailability of U.S. Supreme Court dissents from the bench makes

17
See Timothy R. Johnson et al., Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court Justices to
Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1560, 1581 (2009) (explaining that oral dissents “signal
litigants and other actors . . . that the [Court’s] decision is a bad one and someone must act to change
it”).
18
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REV. 123, 128 (2005)
(arguing that “the argument for minimalism is strongest in an identifiable class of cases: those in which
American society is morally divided, those in which the Court is not confident that it knows the right
answer, and those in which the citizenry is likely to profit from more sustained debate and reflection”).
19
See Kramer, supra note 2, at 697 (complaining that lawyers and lay people alike assume
without real question that the U.S. Supreme Court has sole interpretative authority over the federal
Constitution).
20
See Cover, supra note 15, at 53 (describing state-backed law as tending to destroy all
competing legal norms).
21
See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2009).
22
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). At the time of publication, this case had not been published in the U.S.
Reporter.
23
See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretive authority has elided into
that of the state courts).
24
See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 26–27 (emphasizing the special significance of spoken
dissents).
25
Id. at 27.
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them poor candidates, at present, for democratic engagement. However,
Guinier’s distinction between oral and written dissents may be somewhat
hyperbolic. A Justice who authored a stirring written dissent but declined
to read it aloud might be forgiven for concluding, like the poet, that
“Between my finger and my thumb/ The squat pen rests./ I’ll dig with it.”27
Applying Guinier’s concept of demosprudence to written dissents seems to
sacrifice little of the theory’s descriptive and normative power.
Critics of demosprudence theory notably include the political scientist
Gerald Rosenberg. He argues that the theory, although an effort to link the
Court with democratic deliberation and with the popular legitimacy such
deliberation would provide, hinges on wildly misplaced optimism about
how much the public knows or cares about the Supreme Court’s work.28
For Professor Rosenberg, legal elites’ concentrated gaze on the U.S.
Supreme Court, even when purporting to study grassroots activism, reveals
a blind romanticism. Rosenberg argues that demosprudence imprudently
ignores the institutions of popular politics, the majoritarian venues through
which democratic deliberation really happens.29
In rebuttal, Robert Post points out that precious few members of the
public could identify congressional leaders or the faceless activists who toil
on party platforms, either, yet those politicians’ importance to how
American popular government works appears beyond cavil. This is
because, Post suggests, deliberative democracy operates more through
public debate and communal relationships than through the measurable
results of superficial shifts in public-opinion polls.30 Indeed, Guinier’s
understanding of demosprudence explicitly depends on this subtler (yet
more profound) concept of politics.31
Beyond defending Guinier’s development of demosprudential theory,
Professor Post, with Reva Siegel, has also recently contributed to the
literature on the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and
democratic action. They explain that political backlash to U.S. Supreme
Court opinions, often viewed with dismay by juriscentric legal elites,
actually exhibits the mutually influential relationship between grassroots
26
See Frederick C. Harris, Specifying the Mechanism Linking Dissent to Action, 89 B.U. L. REV.
605, 607 (2009) (noting that the possibility of oral dissents provoking grassroots action is hampered by
the public’s lack of access to these spoken texts).
27
SEAMUS HEANEY, Digging, reprinted in NEW SELECTED POEMS: 1966–1987, at 2 (1990).
28
See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 563, 564 (2009) (arguing that
ordinary people simply do not know about the Court’s opinions and that even elites care only about the
holdings, not the Justices’ reasoning or rhetoric). But see Dion Farganis, Does Reasoning Matter? The
Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy (July 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434726 (arguing that the reasoning in a Supreme Court opinion
does affect how a lay reader perceives the opinion’s legitimacy).
29
Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 564.
30
See Post, supra note 11, at 583–85 (2009) (rejecting Rosenberg’s reliance on observable and
quantifiable factors as the sole determinants of political significance).
31
See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining that the goal of demosprudential
dissenters is not necessarily a shift in voting percentages, but a shift in public normative discourse).

592

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:585

32

politics and Court decisions. This connection offers the Supreme Court a
measure of democratic legitimacy that helps it escape the charge that its
countermajoritarian power undermines popular sovereignty.33 Backlash,
though obviously undesirable to the Justices whose interpretations face
public rejection, potentially strengthens rather than weakens the Court as a
crafter of nomos.34 And how do the Court’s opinions engage the ordinary
people who then respond politically? Post argues that the Justices use the
“familiar techniques” we recognize in demosprudence theory: a
combination of both standard legal reasoning and emotional rhetoric to
inspire and persuade.35
III. INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM
The new scholarship on demosprudence has focused exclusively on the
role of the U.S. Supreme Court in engaging grassroots democracy, to the
exclusion of state courts (or, indeed, of states at all). Similarly, the best
recent scholarship on state constitutionalism has largely overlooked the
relationship between courts and ordinary people in constitutional
interpretation, in favor of scrupulous attention to the dialogue between
state high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. The most prominent
exception, Douglas Reed’s 1999 article,36 links state constitutions to
popular democracy, but treats the interaction between state constitutional
interpretation and political forces as internal to each state. Nevertheless,
the state constitutionalists’ theory of federalism amply rewards careful
study.
James
Gardner’s
path-breaking book,
Interpreting
State
Constitutions,37 proposes an elegant solution to a problem that has vexed
state high courts and their academic observers since Justice Brennan’s
famous call for state constitutional interpretation independent of federal
precedent.38 The difficulty is that many state constitutions include rights
provisions worded identically (or close enough) to corresponding
provisions in the federal Constitution; what might legitimate a state court
32

See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 390–91 (2007) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court decisions can provoke a
backlash that consists of ordinary people debating constitutional meaning and acting on their legal
understanding).
33
See id. at 383 (arguing that one reason for popular loyalty to the Supreme Court is its potential
responsiveness to democratic demands).
34
See id. at 395 (suggesting that backlash might be essential to retaining the democratic
legitimacy of judicial opinions).
35
Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CAL. L. REV. 429, 441
(1998).
36
Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 874–75 (1999).
37
See generally GARDNER, supra note 5.
38
See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L REV. 489, 491 (1977) (calling for state courts to interpret their state constitutions as more
rights-protective than federal constitutional jurisprudence).
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in giving such a provision any meaning other than the U.S. Supreme
Court’s authoritative interpretation?39 Professor Gardner’s functional
approach positions states as competitors to the national government for the
People’s trust and affection.40 Like Lawrence Friedman’s earlier work,41
Gardner’s theory suggests that state courts should unabashedly consider
such matching clauses as an invitation to check and balance the U.S.
The beneficiaries of this
Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence.42
interpretive redundancy are the People themselves, Gardner maintains.43 If
either the state or federal high court protects individual liberty
insufficiently, the other stands ready to fill the breach.44
Gardner concedes, as he must, that states have frequently been on the
wrong side of the state-federal competition to protect individual liberty.45
But state constitutions offer state high courts at least the capacity to
consider both intrastate domestic arrangements and the relationship
between the state and federal governments. Gardner’s larger challenge lies
in explaining what nomos authorizes independent state interpretation. In
no uncertain terms, Gardner has steadily rejected the search for an
independent state “character” that might provide a normative community
sufficient to justify constitutional interpretation.46 Instead, Gardner
reminds us that state citizens are national citizens, too, and that state
constitutions exist in a legal universe premised on a federalism prescribed

39
See Friedman, supra note 7, at 96–97 (noting that independent interpretation of state
constitutional clauses parallel to federal constitutional clauses has attracted criticism as result-oriented
judicial activism).
40
See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 125–26 (emphasizing the role of states as a protection for
individuals against overreaching national power, and vice versa).
41
See Friedman, supra note 7, at 97 (arguing that autonomous state constitutional interpretation
can provide a useful protection against inadequate U.S. Supreme Court rights protection).
42
See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 254–55 (explaining that matching constitutional provisions
invite the state high court to react to U.S. Supreme Court doctrine and resist the federal interpretation
where appropriate).
43
See id. at 256 (discussing the importance of different levels of government being able to act
independently in the best interests of the people).
44
See id. at 254–55 (noting that the same provision in state and federal constitutions can best
serve the people as interpreted by the respective state and federal authorities).
45
See id. at 135 (noting that states have historically posed an even greater threat to individual
liberty than the federal government); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of
American Federalism: Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 666–67 (2005–06)
(describing the states’ rabid red-baiting and oppressive speech restrictions, above and beyond the
national effort, during World War I and the McCarthy era).
46
See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 231–32 (emphasizing that state citizens derive their political
identity from their concurrent status as national citizens); James A. Gardner, Southern Character,
Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional
Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1291 (1998) (empirically attacking the argument that state
constitutions reflect unique state values or character). For the view that federalism is only justified
where the subnational units do express a deep set of norms distinct from national values, see MALCOLM
M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC COMPROMISE 60–61
(2008).
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by the national Constitution. Therefore, Gardner implies that the national
character and national values provide the normative foundation for state
constitutional interpretation.
Robert Schapiro, like Gardner, accepts the implausibility of founding
autonomous state constitutionalism on unique state “character.”48 Rather
than looking toward a national nomos, however, Professor Schapiro
decouples state constitutions from actual communities of value. Instead,
he argues that state constitutions contain, in the texts themselves, all of the
normative foundation an interpreter might need. For Schapiro, it is the
imagined, aspirational nomos described (or implied) in the constitutional
text that ought to drive constitutional interpretation, not any actual or
perceived normative community in the real world.49 Schapiro’s concept is
especially useful as a justification for counter-majoritarian state
constitutional interpretation; the judicial result may not comport with the
values of the state’s actual population, but it reflects the fundamental
values fixed in the text.50 Implicit in this aspect of Schapiro’s theory lies
the central idea that law can influence the ordinary person’s understanding
of constitutional values: if the state court’s mediation of the constitutional
words into actual law could not move the state polity toward the
constitutional aspirations, then the law’s violence would be futile and
cruel.
Even though autonomous state constitutional interpretation derives
justification from each state’s particular constitutional text, Schapiro’s later
work emphasizes that states are not stand-alone entities. Rather, state and
federal power overlap, like the sounds of woodwinds and strings in a single
orchestra: what Schapiro calls “polyphonic” or “interactive” federalism.51
In this view, the state and federal governments each operate
simultaneously on the same subject matter as the other, not within separate
spheres of substantive jurisdiction. Geography, Schapiro maintains, not
regulatory field, distinguishes state from federal power.52 Given states’
overlapping authority with national institutions, Schapiro brilliantly
observes that when state law differs from national law (as when state high
courts offer independent interpretations of state constitutional provisions
textually identical to federal provisions), the result serves as resistance to
47
See GARDNER, supra note 5, at 231–32 (“[S]tate government power is allocated and deployed
not only to ensure good internal self-governance on the state level, but also to ensure the success of the
larger federal system of which state government is a part.”).
48
See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV.
389, 398 (1998) (rejecting existing state norms as a valid basis for independent state constitutional
interpretation).
49
See id. at 394 (“Rather than relying on vague generalities about state character, judges can turn
their attention to the State Constitution itself . . . .”).
50
See id.
51
See SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 6, at 92–95; Schapiro, Interactive
Federalism, supra note 6, at 285–86 (2005).
52
See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 6, at 285 (“The scope of this political
authority is defined by territory, not by subject matter.”).
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the U.S. Supreme Court. A state’s divergent view of a constitutional
right can illustrate an alternative legal world, thereby demonstrating for
officials and citizens alike that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks the final,
definitive, jurispathic word.54
Like Gardner and Schapiro, Paul Kahn rejects states as autonomous
nomoi.55 Kahn explains state constitutionalism by emphasizing that state
constitutions are situated in a federal structure and therefore always exist in
a national context.56 The role of state high courts in interpreting their
constitutions independently from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
“accords with a longstanding justification of federalism,” Professor Kahn
says, “under which state governments provide a forum for discussion,
disagreement, and opposition to actions of the national government.”57
Reflecting his view that state constitutional interpretation is really about
discovering the meaning of a naturalistic “American” constitution, Kahn
admires Thomas Cooley’s 1878 treatise on state constitutionalism because
it treated the whole field as a single interpretive project across states, rather
than as a series of unique state texts.58 For Kahn, the reduction of
American constitutional discourse to the holdings of the federal Supreme
Court represents a massive social failure; he therefore calls for a renewed
interpretive debate over fundamental values in Congress, in law schools,
and particularly in the state high courts.59
The consensus of these state constitutional theorists, then, is that state
high courts can and do serve as sites of contestation over deep national
values. Given their capacity to insulate state constitutional holdings from
U.S. Supreme Court review, state high courts enjoy a special power to
resist the Supreme Court’s tendency to shrink the national constitutional
imagination.
IV. CAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS WORK AS FEDERAL
DEMOSPRUDENTIAL DISSENTS?
As noted above, adherents to the contemporary demosprudence school
of thought focus exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court as the judicial
institution capable of inspiring democratic action (and thereby earning
democratic legitimacy). Interestingly, anthropologist Sally Engle Merry
53

See id. at 288–90 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), as one such example).
See id. at 289 (noting that state law can serve as an inspiring rebuke to federal jurisprudence).
55
See Kahn, supra note 4, at 1148 (“The diversity of state courts is best understood as a diversity
of interpretive bodies, not as a multiplicity of representatives of distinct sovereigns.”).
56
See id. at 1166 (arguing that state courts should view their constitutions in light of “American
constitutionalism”).
57
Id.
58
See id. at 1162–63; see generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
(4th ed. 1878).
59
See Kahn, supra note 4, at 1155 (arguing that democracy depends on a rich constitutional
discourse expressive of more than a single institution’s constitutional view).
54
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found trial-level courts and officials to be profoundly influential in
inspiring new popular understandings of legally contested values. She
noted that trial courtrooms are the scenes of performances, which “allow
authoritative judicial and prosecutorial figures to interpret everyday life in
new ways.”60 Professor Merry’s research suggests the potential power of
courts—other than the U.S. Supreme Court—to foster democratic
deliberation. This section asks whether state high court constitutional
decisions might share some part of the demosprudential potential of U.S.
Supreme Court dissents.
By posing this question, I do not intend to consider state constitutional
dissents, though those judicial writings might well be concerned with the
contestation and negotiation of national values. In part, this Essay adopts
this approach because a state high court that gives its state constitution a
meaning different from federal jurisprudence already acts as a minority
voice; the state court already rejects the federal holding (although possibly
not for the same reasons as dissenting federal Justices). State court
dissents then fill the role of defending the conception of national values
explained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion, and so become
apologia for the federally-declared law rather than writings of
jurisgenerative potential. Nor does this Essay intend to review state high
court decisions of federal constitutional law. For one thing, an essay
asking whether state court determinations of federal law might plausibly be
viewed as about federal law would not likely be interesting, even to legal
academics. For another, such decisions fall unambiguously under the
authoritative control of the U.S. Supreme Court,61 and although state courts
might use the opportunity to critique federal jurisprudence, the U.S.
Supreme Court can sap the potency of any judicial back-talk with a binding
reversal.
Finally, my interest here lies in the capacity of state
constitutional decisions to inspire a national political response from
ordinary people. State constitutional decisions can, and certainly do,
provoke the sort of democratic backlash described by Post and Siegel
within the affected state.62 This Essay’s query, which links for the first
time the exciting recent developments in demosprudence theory and
interactive federalism, asks whether the opinions of state high court
majorities interpreting state constitutions might function as federal
constitutional demosprudential dissents.
This inquiry invites three questions. First, are state high courts really
60

SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI‘I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 261 (2000).
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038–41 (1983) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court
may review state court decisions of mixed state and federal law in the absence of a clear statement that
the state disposition is independently supported by state law).
62
See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009) (acknowledging that a popular
initiative, Proposition 8, had amended the state constitution to supersede the holding of a state court
constitutional decision); see also Reed, supra note 36, at 887–89 (describing the “democratic
penetration” into state constitutional interpretation).
61
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talking about the same thing as the U.S. Supreme Court when they
interpret state constitutional provisions differently from the matching
federal constitutional provisions? In other words, can state constitutional
decisions really function as a species of national constitutional law?
Second, if state constitutionalism is indeed at least potentially a
commentary on federal constitutionalism, can a state constitutional
majority opinion function as a dissent, which by definition lacks the force
of law? And finally, can state constitutional decisions meet the
democracy-enhancing criteria described in demosprudence theory? The
remainder of this Essay suggests that the answer to each of these questions
might be “yes.”
A. Can
State
Constitutional
Constitutionalism?

Decisions

Work

as

Federal

To start, one must remember that the more common technique of state
constitutional interpretation is not divergence from federal precedent, but
near-obsequious adherence to it.63 From the practical perspective of state
courts, then, and for better or for worse, state constitutionalism is already
driven largely by federal doctrine and federal values.64
The work on interactive federalism by Gardner, Schapiro, and Kahn
described above further demonstrates that even “independent” state
constitutional interpretation is best understood as intimately bound to
federal constitutionalism. Because state citizens’ political identity is tied
to the national, rather than state, community,65 even state judges who
attempt to read the character of their state for purposes of autonomous
constitutional interpretation will end up finding a national nomos. As Post
and Siegel remind us, open-ended constitutional provisions like those
protecting liberty and equality invite courts to express national values.66
These open-ended provisions in state constitutions extend the same
invitation. In the political practices of ordinary people, we see “a social
consensus that fundamental values in this country will be debated and
resolved on a national level.”67
If state constitutional interpreters are really engaged in construing a set
63
See Schapiro, Interactive Federalism, supra note 6, at 290–91 (noting that state high courts
usually interpret state constitutional provisions by simply adopting U.S. Supreme Court reasoning and
results).
64
See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1502 (2005) (noting that
state courts interpreting state constitutions follow federal jurisprudence in the “clear majority” of
cases).
65
See Cover, supra note 15, at 48–49 (observing that “by the mid-twentieth century the states had
long since lost their character as political communities”).
66
See Post & Siegel, supra note 32, at 378–79 (relating national nomos to the judicial
interpretation of deep constitutional debates).
67
James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 828
(1992).
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of national constitutional values, as described here, then an important
challenge is why the U.S. Supreme Court should lack the authority to
impose its final interpretation on these values.68 Regardless of any “plain
statement”69 they might make, why should state courts be permitted to
diverge from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of national
constitutional requirements if their state constitutional clauses are merely
alternative articulations of those same national values? Robert Williams
has argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern for federalism, a
concern that seeps into even ordinary individual-rights cases, renders the
federal precedents inadequate to teach state high courts what the
underlying values ought to be when the filter of federalism is removed.70
Gardner’s functional theory and Schapiro’s interactive federalism,
which both argue for a self-consciously federalist approach to state
constitutional interpretation, derive their legitimacy from the federal
Constitution itself, which carves out from federal oversight the legal space
in which state constitutions operate.71 This constitutional space leads to an
important consequence. Both the public and legal elites typically believe
that the U.S. Supreme Court has the last word on the meaning of
constitutional liberty and equality.72 Even the Court itself thinks so.73 But
this is false.74
From the perspective of the ordinary person, state constitutional
interpretation of liberty and equality often offers the last word. To the cop
on the beat concerned with executing a lawful search and seizure, the
union organizer wishing to distribute petitions in the shopping mall, or the
speeding motorist seeking to contest her ticket before a jury, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s determination of these rights under the federal
Constitution’s text is the starting point, not the ending point, for analysis.75
The law that actually applies, the word that bears the threat of violence, is
the state court’s state constitutional interpretation. If the police officer
searches a car without a warrant because federal constitutional doctrine so
permits, she will still have done wrong if the state constitutional court has
68

I am grateful to Rick Kay for raising this point.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (declaring that the U.S. Supreme Court will
treat state high courts’ constitutional decisions as presumptively federal unless the state court opinion
includes a “plain statement” that the decision rests on state constitutional law).
70
See Williams, supra note 11, at 389–90 (noting how the U.S. Supreme Court seems constrained
by federalism concerns inapplicable to the states).
71
See Friedman, supra note 7, at 97.
72
See Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell
Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 954–55 (2009).
73
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
74
Cf. Mazzone, supra note 23 (noting how the U.S. Supreme Court has, for practical purposes,
surrendered much of its interpretive authority over the federal Constitution to state courts).
75
See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (cataloging state constitutional protection of
equality and liberty above the federal floor).
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protected the privacy of citizens’ cars. If the mall manager expels the
pamphleteer because the Supreme Court has declined to find free speech
protection against private parties, the expulsion will still be unlawful if the
state constitution offers a stronger protection of free expression.
Of course, perhaps a particular state high court has not protected the
liberty or equality claim at question beyond the protection offered by the
U.S. Supreme Court. But that conclusion reflects the state high court’s
agreement with the Supreme Court majority’s view of the disputed rights,
not a lack of power in the state court to disagree. Thus, the final,
authoritative judicial declaration of how much rights protection individual
citizens actually receive commonly depends on state constitutional
interpretation.76
This means that any popular discontent with judicial rights
protection“Why, there oughta be a law!”might be targeted at federal
institutions and articulated in federal terms,77 but reflects a (perhaps
unwitting) response to state constitutionalism. The speeder wishing to
contest her ticket before a jury but told she lacks the right to do so might
complain about an inadequate Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, but it
is also the state constitution that did not protect her right (although it could
have). If the speeder is truly exercised, she might initiate democratic
debate leading to a change in the federal understanding of jury-trial rights.
But that national result was caused, in part, by the state high court’s
interpretation of the state constitution. As Gardner eloquently observes,
“My welfare, in other words, depends not only on our shared national
Constitution and on my state constitution, but also to some extent on your
state constitution as well.”78 State constitutions form a front-line part of
the overall American constitutional net protecting liberty and equality. It
would seem both fair and accurate, then, to suggest that state constitutional
decisions form part of the ongoing federal constitutional interpretive
project.
B. Can State Constitutional Decisions Work as Federal Dissents?
State constitutional majority decisions are law. They mediate,
legitimize, and mobilize real violence against human beings.79 Dissents,
on the other hand, do not. A dissent is a “story,” an emotional outburst or

76
The state constitution might be interpreted to be less protective than the federal Constitution,
but it would then have the same practical effect as if it had the same level of protection, because federal
law is supreme.
77
See, e.g., Area Man Passionate Defender of What He Imagines Constitution To Be, ONION,
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.theonion.com/content/news/area_man_passionate_defender_of (satirically
illustrating the cultural prominence of the federal Constitution).
78
GARDNER, supra note 5, at 122.
79
See Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1606 (1986)
(identifying the use or threat of violence as essential to the distinction between law and literature).
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an attempt to persuade, but powerless to “announce[] . . . new law.”80
How, then, could a decision be a dissent? To begin to resolve that
paradox, this Essay first considers why any judge might take the trouble to
pen a dissent.
Standard explanations for dissenting might envision the dissent as
motivated by an attempt to persuade a future Supreme Court to reverse
course or an effort to gain political capital for the dissenter against the
other Justices for use in future disputes.81 Demosprudence, as seen
already, explains some dissents as an attempt to inspire democratic
action.82 Additionally, Justice Brennan once suggested that one reason for
a federal Justice to dissent lies in the dissent’s potential to persuade a state
high court to adopt the dissenter’s rationale as a matter of state
constitutional law.83 Could state constitutional decisions, in turn, influence
the interpretative strategies of national institutions, including the U.S.
Supreme Court? Recent empirical work suggests that “[f]rom due process
to equal protection, from the First Amendment to the Fourth and Sixth, the
[U.S.] Supreme Court routinelyand explicitlybases constitutional
protection on whether a majority of states agree with it.”84
State constitutional decisions, although binding in the state where
issued, are merely persuasive everywhere else. They do not impose the
state judges’ views on the national polity. In this way, state constitutional
decisions are simultaneously law and not-law, depending on one’s
territorial vantage point. The generic reasons for dissenting might also
help motivate a state high court to adopt an independent state constitutional
analysis. For example, just as a Justice might use a dissent to convince her
colleagues that future disagreements might provoke future dissents, so a
prior independent state constitutional interpretation might serve as a signal
to the U.S. Supreme Court that the state high court is willing to reject
federal doctrine again in the future.85
To the extent they find federal constitutional jurisprudence
unpersuasive—which is frequently the case when a state court construes its
state constitution beyond the federal floor—state high courts implicitly or
explicitly criticize the U.S. Supreme Court. Doing so might come at some
cost to norms of collegiality and respect, just as dissenting from within the

80

Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 48–49.
See Johnson et al., supra note 17, at 1568–69 (describing reasons to dissent).
82
See Guinier, Courting the People, supra note 15, at 544–45.
83
See William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, In Defense of
Dissents, Third Annual Matthew O. Tobriner Memorial Lecture at the University of California,
Hastings College of Law (Nov. 18, 1985), in 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986).
84
Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
85
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992) (justifying a state
constitutional interpretation at odds with federal doctrine by reference to an earlier independent state
constitutional interpretation).
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86

Court does, so one might not be surprised to find autonomous state
constitutionalism practiced only intermittently.87 Nevertheless, the state
judges might be motivated to pay that cost by a desire to change future
federal doctrine, to gain credibility vis-à-vis the U.S. Supreme Court, and
to inspire public political action. The following review of the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s decision in Sheff and the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision
in Varnum suggests that the functions of a dissent do indeed underlie these
state courts’ independent constitutional interpretation.
C. Can State Constitutional Decisions Meet the Demosprudence Criteria?
Guinier proposes a three-part definition of the demosprudential dissent.
First, the dissent must be centrally concerned with an “issue of
democracy”; second, the writing must be easily comprehensible to ordinary
people outside of the legal elite; and, finally, the dissent must “appear[] to
inspire nonjudicial actors to participate in some form of collective problem
solving.”88 Notably, on their face, none of these criteria are exclusively
limited to U.S. Supreme Court dissents. If an independent state
constitutional decision deals with issues of liberty, equality, or basic
governmental structure, is written in plain terms, and seems to target
ordinary people to deliberate democratically, then the decision would seem
to satisfy the core characteristics of a demosprudential dissent. To test
whether state constitutional decisions can sometimes meet these criteria,
this Essay now turns to actual examples of independent state
constitutionalism.
V. SHEFF V. O’NEILL AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted an
increasingly hostile view toward desegregation and education rights. In
cases like San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, holding
that a Texas school financing system that disadvantaged poor schools did
not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause,89 and Milliken v. Bradley,
holding that remedial orders for de jure segregation must be confined to
the district found to have segregated rather than directed toward a regional
solution,90 the U.S. Supreme Court clearly signaled its impatience to end
federal court efforts to reverse racial isolation in public schools. The
Court’s distaste for ongoing supervision of school desegregation continued

86

See Johnson et al., supra note 17, at 1570 (establishing empirically the significance of
collegiality as a motivation to dissent or not).
87
See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 42 (2006) (noting
the phenomenon of inconsistently independent state constitutional interpretation).
88
See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 16.
89
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41, 54–55 (1973).
90
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
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with cases like Allen v. Wright. There, parents of black schoolchildren
sued to compel the Internal Revenue Service to enforce anti-discrimination
rules against all-white (yet purportedly tax-exempt) private schools, but the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.92
These cases certainly gave civil rights lawyers (and the children they
represented) good reason to feel discouraged. Early lawsuits in federal
court designed to repair the racial isolation in inner-city schools were
dropped when Milliken made plain that the federal Constitution could not
support inter-district desegregation.93 Yet, rather than accept the Supreme
Court’s normative vision of a color-blind Constitution upholding a
radically racist education system, civil rights lawyers looked for alternative
spaces in which they could contest the federal Court’s proffered nomos.
Specifically, they turned to state constitutionalism.94
In April 1989, lawyers from a host of state and national civil rights
organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (“LDF”), filed a
complaint in Connecticut Superior Court seeking a declaration that the
isolation of racial minorities in the Hartford Public Schools breached the
state’s constitutional obligation to provide equal educational opportunity.95
Unlike conventional school desegregation cases at the time, the plaintiffs
did not raise federal constitutional claims because they alleged only de
facto segregation, not the de jure segregation the U.S. Supreme Court had
come to require before finding a constitutional violation.96 The plaintiffs’
efforts would be vindicated, in 1996, by the Connecticut Supreme Court
decision in Sheff v. O’Neill.97
In shifting from federal to state constitutional litigation, lawyers like
John Brittain of the Sheff plaintiffs’ team were not expressing an epiphany
that Connecticut values, rather than American values, would provide the
moral girding necessary for constitutionalized desegregation. To the
contrary, these legal elitesthe cream of the national civil rights
91
468 U.S. 737, 757–58 (1984) (holding that the claimed injury of diminished education to
children was not fairly traceable to the government conduct alleged to be unlawful).
92
See id. at 739–40.
93
See SUSAN B. EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL 80–81
(2006) (describing Hartford-area school desegregation cases filed in federal court but rejected upon
application of Milliken); George Judson, Civil Rights Lawyers Hope to Use Hartford Schools Case as a
Model, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1996, at B1 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-integrationist
decision in Milliken led to the failure of Hartford school desegregation cases filed in federal court).
94
See Peter D. Enrich, Race and Money, Courts and Schools: Tentative Lessons from
Connecticut, 36 IND. L. REV. 523, 524–25 (2003) (noting that education reform advocates turned
toward state constitutional litigation to advance public school integration after U.S. Supreme Court
retrenchment in the 1970s).
95
See EATON, supra note 93, at 93, 111–12 (describing the story behind the filing of Sheff).
96
See Charlotte Libov, State Readies Court Reply to Desegregation Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1989, at 12CN1 (describing the gravamen of the Sheff complaint).
97
678 A.2d 1267, 1270–71 (Conn. 1996). For a previous study of this case, see Justin R. Long,
Comment, Enforcing Affirmative State Constitutional Obligations and Sheff v. O’Neill, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 277 (2002).
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barpersisted in their belief that the federal Constitution should have been
construed to protect equal educational opportunity; state constitutional
litigation was the lawyers’ solution to evade the restrictive federal
precedents while still offering school children across the country a
constitutional remedy.98 After all, the racial isolation in Hartfordwhere
over ninety percent of the students were black or Latino, contrasted with
the suburbs, where over ninety percent of the students were white99was a
small part of a nationwide pattern that persists today. In American public
schools, most black children have been assigned to mostly minority
schools; there has never been a single year where our schools were more
integrated than that.100 Funding for the Sheff plaintiffs from the ACLU and
the LDF would hardly have been forthcoming if those national
organizations did not see the case as a role model of national significance.
The Sheff complaint thus illustrates the practical role of state
constitutionalism as an alternative site to contest American constitutional
values and reiterates the potential of state constitutionalism to stand as a
counterweight to the U.S. Supreme Court’s perceived role as final arbiter
of constitutional values.
One might appropriately see the origins of the Sheff complaint as
support for the interactive federalism theory: state constitutionalism as
commentary on national constitutional values. But does the state high
court’s opinion in Sheff satisfy Guinier’s criteria for demosprudence?
First, demosprudence requires the case to be about an “issue of
democracy.”101 School desegregation, the issue in Sheff, unequivocally
fits.
As a recent student commentator records, training for the
responsibilities of democratic citizenship has always been a prominent
purpose of public education in this country.102 Education philosopher Amy
Gutmann has written comprehensively on the mutually affirming
importance of public education and democratic citizenship.103 And the
Sheff court itself acknowledged the close relationship between educational
equity and the success of American democracy.104 Issues of race and
children are also culturally powerful and controversial, and so likely to
strike ordinary Americans as foundational in a way that other issues might
not.
Second, a demosprudential opinion is written in a rhetorical style that
98

See EATON, supra note 93, at 112.
See Libov, supra note 96 (providing racial balance statistics).
100
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338 (Viking 2002) (describing the national failure to integrate public schools).
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See Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 16.
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See Donnelly, supra note 72, at 964–65.
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See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 139–48 (1999) (describing the undemocratic
nature of unequal educational opportunity).
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avoids legal jargon and is within the reading comprehension of ordinary
people. Parts, but not all, of the Sheff decision satisfy this criterion. “The
public elementary and high school students in Hartford suffer daily from
the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as poverty,
have had on their education,” wrote Chief Justice Ellen Peters for the Sheff
court.105 In words surely everyone could understand, the court announced
its disposition: “We hold today that the needy schoolchildren of Hartford
have waited long enough.”106 Although the court declined to issue an
injunction or other remedy beyond its declaratory judgment, it explained
the urgency behind its holding, reminding readers that “[f]inding a way to
cross the racial and ethnic divide has never been more important than it is
today.”107 These phrases are both simple and powerful. They appear in the
Connecticut Reports, but they would not be tonally out of place in a
newspaper editorial or on a television talk show. The rhetoric appeals to
emotions and values as much as to cold legal logic. In this sense, Sheff
exhibits the second feature of a demosprudential opinion.
Finally, demosprudence requires the judicial writing to target people
outside of the legal elite for inspiration toward democratic change. Some
features of the decision do seem self-consciously outward-looking in this
fashion. In introducing the case, for example, the court noted that the
complaint “raises questions that are difficult; the answers that we give are
controversial. We are, however, persuaded that a fair reading of the text
and history of [the state constitution] . . . [demands a public school system
that] provides Connecticut schoolchildren with a substantially equal
educational opportunity.”108 These lines seem like an attempt to forestall a
backlash; it is as if the court is saying that it knows many people will not
like its decision, but that the public should trust the court’s sincerity and
wisdom. As Post and Siegel have taught us, backlashes are themselves
instances of democratic engagement with constitutionalism,109 and so for
the Sheff court to attempt to calm citizens who might otherwise be tempted
to engage in popular sovereignty logically implies that the court is
speaking to ordinary people outside the legal elite. The remedial portion of
Sheff, though, is the most clearly outward-looking component of the
opinion. Chief Justice Peters wrote:
In staying our hand, we do not wish to be
misunderstood. . . . Every passing day shortchanges these
children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own
well-being and to that of this state and nation. We direct the
legislature and the executive branch to put the search for
105

Id. at 1270.
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Id. at 1280.
109
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appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective
agendas. We are confident that with energy and good will,
appropriate remedies can be found and implemented in time
to make a difference before another generation of children
suffers the consequences of a segregated public school
education.110
In this passage, the court is speaking to the public and to public
officials quite explicitly, in both tone and substance. In that sense, the
opinion seeks to engage ordinary people and inspire them toward political
action, and so satisfies the third element of a demosprudential opinion.
Indeed, Sheff has inspired much political debate in Connecticut (though
disappointingly little action).111
The true test of whether a state constitutional opinion can be a federal
constitutional demosprudential dissent, however, presumably cannot rest
on inspiring local political action.112 Evidence that Sheff inspired ordinary
people or political leaders to reconsider or debate national values would go
further toward establishing the demosprudential potential of state
constitutional opinions. As it happens, some evidence of that type does
exist. For example, one of Connecticut’s U.S. Senators referred to Sheff by
name in an address in favor of education reform on the Senate floor.113 An
editorial in the Christian Science Monitor, a national newspaper, praised
Sheff and situated the case unambiguously in the national struggle for
educational equity, arguing that “[c]ourt decisions like that in Connecticut,
though they offer no pat solutions, can at least keep us focused on the need
to work together toward a more meaningful education for all America’s
children.”114 And predictably, civil rights lawyers from other states were
eager to learn from the Connecticut experience so as to seek similar
progress from their own state courts.115
On balance, the Sheff opinion seems to satisfy Guinier’s concept of a
federal constitutional demosprudential dissent. The case was brought to
avoid giving the U.S. Supreme Court the final word in an area of law
where it had declined to protect liberty and equality, and the state high
court did indeed use its power to interpret the state constitution to reject the
110
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16, 2009, at A3 (quoting the co-chairman of the state legislature’s education committee urging support
for increased education funding by asking the legislature to meet “‘its [still un-satisfied] legal and
moral responsibilities’” under Sheff).
112
But cf. Guinier, Foreword, supra note 3, at 12 (describing a Louisville school official’s use of
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved to promote local political change).
113
See 147 CONG. REC. S1271-02 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. Lieberman)
(supporting an amendment to the Elementary & Secondary Education Act of 1965 by praising a
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authority of unfavorable federal precedent. The case was about a crucial
problem confronting American democracy. In addressing that problem,
the court’s opinion speaks in emotional, moral tones to reach and inspire
members of the general public. And the opinion urges politicians and
ordinary people to respond to its holding with democratic vigor,
encouraging a popular debate about national constitutional values and
prioritiesthe American nomos.
VI. VARNUM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Can the potential of state constitutional decisions to serve as federal
constitutional demosprudential dissents find expression in cases other than
Sheff? The Iowa Supreme Court’s recent same-sex marriage decision,
Varnum v. Brien,116 suggests that Sheff might not be just an outlier.
First, although decided strictly on state constitutional grounds, Justice
Cady’s decision in Varnum is entirely bereft of any suggestion that the
justices would have decided the case differently if they were sitting on the
U.S. Supreme Court. The justices applied federal-style equal protection
reasoning,117 they cited federal precedents,118 and they expressed a
(unanimous) moral confidence that transcended text or jurisdiction.119 The
Varnum court sought to effectuate the aspirational values of the state
constitution, as Schapiro would encourage, but the values the court
identified are national in scope and significance, as the court selfconsciously noted: “The same-sex-marriage debate waged in this case is
part of a strong national dialogue centered on a fundamental, deep-seated,
traditional institution that has excluded, by state action, a particular class of
Iowans.”120 Varnum, to its very core, is about national constitutional
values.
Furthermore, the decision proudly rejects U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the issue at bar, and in that sense works as a federal
dissent, consistent with interactive federalism. Some rejection is explicit,
as where the court lists a series of Iowa constitutional decisions extending
equality protections in advance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of
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the same rights.
Some rejection is stated only indirectly, as where the
court uses federal constitutional terms of art but reaches a conclusion
contrary to that of the federal government.122 And some rejection is
entirely implicit, as where the court describes the same-sex marriage
question as open under federal Supreme Court precedent,123 without
addressing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision dismissing a same-sex
marriage appeal “for want of [a] substantial federal question” in 1972.124
In acting as a dissent from U.S. Supreme Court constitutional
understandings, the Varnum decision fulfills the functionalist role of state
constitutions described by Gardner; the court protects its citizens from at
least some of the federal government’s intrusions on their right to equality.
As Post and Siegel predicted, state constitutional same-sex marriage
decisions serve as loci of contestation over national values and
constitutional norms.125
Just as Varnum seems to match interactive federalist notions of the role
of state constitutionalism in checking the federal government and courts,
so too the decision fits well with the criteria for a demosprudential dissent.
As a case about marriage, a recognized “fundamental right” under the
federal Constitution, the issue can reasonably be described as one
concerning “democracy.” With respect to tone and accessibility, few
recent constitutional decisions of any American court could match the
powerfully inclusive embrace inherent in these plain and gentle lines:
This lawsuit is a civil rights action by twelve individuals who
reside in six communities across Iowa. Like most Iowans,
they are responsible, caring, and productive individuals . . . .
Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope to
have children. Some are foster parents. Like all Iowans, they
prize their liberties and live within the borders of this state
with the expectation that their rights will be maintained and
protecteda belief embraced by our state motto . . . . Each
maintains a hope of getting married one day, an aspiration
shared by many throughout Iowa.126
The steady repetition of the plaintiffs’ commonalities with “most
Iowans” speaks directly to common folk, reminding them of who they are
and what sort of community they hope to maintain. The court’s emotional,
moral, and simply-phrased tone accomplishes nothing from a coldly
121
See id. at 877 (noting Iowa’s prescient rejection of the later-overturned federal holdings in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1871), and others).
122
See id. at 906 (“We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and lesbian people from the
institution of civil marriage does not substantially further any important governmental objective.”).
123
Id. at 878–79 n.6.
124
See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
125
See Post & Siegel, supra note 32, at 381–82.
126
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872.
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legalistic perspective, but it seems to attempt a reassurance for the ordinary
reader that the court’s decision deserves respect.
Varnum, along with other same-sex marriage cases on both sides of the
issue, appears to have inspired a national debate by activists, politicians,
and the public about the constitutional values the decision expresses.
Activists and organizers for Lambda Legal, the national LGBTQ-rights
organization whose lawyers won the decision in Varnum, also played a
central role in the legal and political fights over same-sex marriage in
California.127 Newspaper reports suggest that Varnum’s influence falls
well beyond the Iowa cornfields; one California minister told a reporter he
thought the decision would spark a popular backlash against “‘activist
judges’ in general,” but a California gay-rights activist predicted to the
same journalist that Iowa’s reputation as “Middle America” and “the
heartland” would open more minds to the possibility of following
Varnum.128 John Logan, a sociologist, agreed that Varnum’s origin in a
rural, Midwest state could make same-sex marriage seem more “related to
core American values” than similar decisions in the high courts of
Furthermore, state constitutional
Massachusetts and California.129
decisions like Varnum might already be increasing the political pressure on
President Obama to expand federal rights for same-sex couples (a vivid
example, if true, of how Gerald Rosenberg’s focus on quantifiable shifts in
polling data might overlook more important aspects of deliberative
democracy).130
VII. CONCLUSION
State constitutional scholars, working over the last decade, have
developed a rich set of theories to explain how state constitutional
decisions can serve as a liberty-enhancing counterweight to U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. In focusing on the state-federal relationship, however, the
scholarship on interactive federalism has paid little attention to the
relationship of this judicial dialogue to deliberative democracy.
On the other hand, the very recent development of demosprudence
theory greatly advances our understanding of the connection between
127
See Lambda Legal, Varnum v. Brien, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/varnum-vbrien.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2009); Lambda Legal, California, http://www.lambdalegal.org/statesregions/california.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2009); see also John Schwartz, Ruling Upholds
California’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1.
128
Jessica Garrison & Maura Dolan, Iowa’s OK of Gay Marriage Could Bolster Prop. 8 Foes,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at A1.
129
See Amy Lorentzen, Same-Sex Marriage Upheld in Iowa: State First in Nation’s Heartland to
Join Massachusetts, Connecticut, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 4, 2009, at 3 (explaining that
decisions in Massachusetts and California could be viewed as extremism on the coasts, rather than
related to core American values).
130
See Michael D. Shear, At White House, Obama Aims to Reassure Gays, WASH. POST, June 30,
2009, at A1 (reporting that President Obama promised to work toward repeal of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act that prohibits federal recognition of same-sex marriages).
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judicial and popular constructions of constitutional values. But that
scholarship overlooks almost entirely the extraordinary capacity of state
constitutional decisions to offer an alternative site for legitimate
contestation of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
This Essay has asked whether these two schools of thought might
contribute to each other. By studying two state constitutional opinions, it
tested the idea that these types of decisions might sometimes work as
demosprudential dissents. Both Sheff v. O’Neill, the Connecticut school
desegregation case, and Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa same-sex marriage
case, appear to function both as examples of interactive federalism and as
examples of demosprudential dissents. Perhaps future scholarship will
continue to espouse an integrated approach toward state constitutionalism
and demosprudence theory.

